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mittee with members of the legal profession. Participation in the actual re-
form discussions was limited mainly to national and local experts, however,
and the general public was not consulted. As Li Xiangning and Xu Kai wrote
in Caijing and Yao Dongxing said in Zhongguo jingji zhoukan, the bulk of
the legislative process was focused on power games between different state
organs: the Supreme Court, the legislature, the Ministry of Public Security,
the public prosecutors, the Ministry of Justice, and other branches of gov-
ernment. The official narrative of reform emphasised public participation,
but the real debate took place mostly at the state level. However, the reform
committee did at least involve stakeholders in the judicial system in the
formulation of reform.
The Ministry of Public Security was quick to get involved in the debate,
issuing a series of proposals that were mainly aimed at strengthening the
powers of the police. Not all of these proposals were adopted. Li Xiangning
and Xu Kai say that no state organ managed to take complete control of
the process, and the final version was a compromise between the viewpoints
of the legislature (lifa bumen 立法部门), the judiciary, and the police (sifa
zhifa bumen 司法执法部门). Their dialogue showed they recognised “the
logic of negotiation” (tanpan de luoji 谈判的逻辑). Debate did take place
among various public actors, but few of them were outside state organs;
experts were really only consulted in an advisory capacity.
The conclusion of the reform process saw the end of the debate. Critical
articles were published only while the law was still under discussion. Articles
published after the adoption of the law ignored any remaining misgivings,
and instead mostly highlighted the advances made in protecting fundamen-
tal freedoms.
z Translated by Elizabeth Laederich.
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Current affairs
Local governments under pressure:
The commodification of stability
maintenance
Analysis by Jérôme Doyon based on:
– Xu Kai and Li Wei’ao, “The stability maintaining machine,” Caijing, 6 June 2011. (1)
– Zhong Weijun, “The ‘zero-incident’ logic of local governments in maintaining stability: An analytical framework,” Zhejiang shehui kexue –
Zhejiang social sciences, no. 9, September 2011. (2)
– Gao Jun, “The trap of maintaining stability and how to avoid it,” Lilun daokan, no. 11, 2011. (3)
– Xia Nan, “The alienation of weiwen,” Caijing, 12 October 2011. (4)
– Zhang Qianfan, “The origin and disruption of the system for petitioning the higher authorities,” Tansuo yu zhengming – Exploration and
free views, 10 May 2012. (5)
In 1994, the Chinese government carried out a tax reform that limitedthe revenues of local governments and made them dependent for fund-ing on central authorities. Since then, local governments have been
caught between the people, who want more social policies that local au-
thorities cannot afford, and the central government, which is focused on
maintaining social stability. Xu Kai, Li Wei’ao, and Xi Nan say that social sta-
bility has become the main priority of local governments. So, for example,
in Yun’an district in the province of Guangdong, out of 6,700 people on the
public authorities’ payroll, 1,800 have jobs related to maintaining stability.
The success of local administrations is evaluated largely on their ability
to maintain social stability. In 2009, “The temporary provision on the en-
forcement of the responsibilities of Party leaders and the State” (guanyu
shixing dangzheng lingdao ganbu wenze de zanxing guiding 关于实行党政
领导干部问责的暂行规定) reaffirmed local government’s responsibility for
incidents that threaten stability, with particular reference to riots and other
mass demonstrations. These articles show that this method of evaluation
puts pressure on local governments. The central authorities have said that
they want to develop the system of “letters and visits” (xinfang 信访), as
reaffirmed in 2005’s “Regulations on letters and visits” (xinfang tiaoli 信访
条例). This administrative practice, which exists parallel to the judiciary sys-
tem, allows citizens to appeal local decisions by presenting a petition to
central authorities. But evaluating local administrations on the basis of so-
cial stability maintenance undermines the system of letters and visits.
In order to appear to be making progress on social stability, local govern-
ments have adopted a logic of “zero incidents” (buchushi luoji 不出事逻辑). (6)
Whatever the cost, they have to make sure they present an image of sta-
bility – even at the risk of not addressing the root causes of various prob-
1. Xu Kai and Li Wei’ao are journalists at Caijing.
2. Zhong Weijun is an associate professor at the School of Political Science and Public Management
at the Zheijiang Institute of Technology.
3. Gao Jun is a professor at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Jiangsu Teachers Uni-
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6. Zhong Weijun attributes this concept to He Xuefeng and Liu Yue. See He Xuefeng and Liu Yue,
“The ‘zero-incident’ logic in local management,” Xueshu yanjiu – Academic research, no. 6, June
2010.
lems. Zhong Weijun and Gao Jun say this logic forces the local authorities
to deal with problems in a very superficial way. They spend more time trying
to stop the authorities in charge of their evaluation from finding out about
problems than they do on actually resolving them. The seriousness of a
problem is judged only in terms of how higher authorities will perceive it.
Zhong says this has contributed to a deterioration of relations between local
authorities and citizens, as the relationship between the two has moved
from one of service to one of “seizure” (juequ 攫取).
Under the system of letters and visits, local governments are supposed to
contact and meet with petitioners (jiefang 接访). Xu Kai and Li Wei’ao show
how, in practice, petitioners are obstructed (jiefang   ) to keep local gov-
ernment evaluations artificially high. Local authorities use several different
tactics to “buy peace” (huaqian mai ping’an 花钱买平安).
Petitioners’ names are deleted from the official registers (xiaohao 销号).
These lists of complainants are kept by the central government, and the eval-
uation of local authorities is partly based on them. Because of corruption
and complicity between the local authorities and their direct superiors, the
names of many petitioners are either not registered at all or are wiped off
official registers in return for kickbacks. The Caijing journalists say that this
turns the political problem of government evaluation into an economic cost.
Another option for local authorities is to arrest petitioners. This can be done
locally through the “centres for maintaining stability” (weiwen ban 维稳办)
at every administrative level. Local governments set up watch lists of likely
nuisances, especially at times of important local festivals or around the an-
nual plenary sessions of “the two assemblies” (the National People’s Congress
and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference) in Beijing. Gao
Jun says that the political fallout from an incident on one of these occasions
would be extremely serious. Xia Nan says local authorities have been known
to issue fines or to illegally detain petitioners, sending them to work camps
or psychiatric hospitals, in order to keep them from appealing to higher au-
thorities. To encourage administrative staff to take action in this way, local
governments have established a system of bonuses. Xu Kai and Li Wei’ao say
functionaries who resolved an “incident” at the village level earned bonuses
of 50 or 100 yuan in 2011, and the reward is even greater for people further
up the administrative ladder. Xu and Li say that the budget for “bonuses” in
Guangdong’s Yun’an District in 2010 was 20,000 yuan – extremely cost-ef-
fective compared with the potential political and economic cost of even one
petitioner lodging a successful complaint in Beijing.
Local authorities can also carry out judgements on petitioners in Beijing
through liaison offices (zhujing banshichu 驻京办事处). The president of a
local court told the Caijing journalists that all young male judges are obliged
to work in the Beijing liaison office of their locality, and that their main job
is to be present at the High Court so as to keep petitioners from lodging
complaints. Serious corruption is endemic in these liaison offices, since their
main objective is to ingratiate themselves with the central authorities to
win benefits for the locality they represent. Zhang Qianfan says that a cor-
ruption scandal in 2009 caused the central authorities to close many of
these offices. Xu and Li say that in mid-2011, 625 liaison offices were closed,
including 50 offices of provinces or special economic zones and 296 city
offices.
But Beijing’s decision to close the liaison offices only forced local govern-
ments to find another way to obstruct petitioners. Zhang says that even if
the government shuts down one way of blocking petitioners, good evalua-
tions for local authorities still depend on a lack of complaints reaching the
central government. Local authorities therefore still need to find ways to
prevent petitions from being lodged. One way to do this is to hire private
companies to arrest the petitioners. As of mid-2011, the Beijing security
company Anyuanding had signed contracts with 19 provinces to turn away,
arrest, or detain petitioners in illegal detention centres, or black jails (hei
jianyu 黑监狱). Zhang sees it as the height of cynicism that the effect of
closing liaison offices was to enable these sordid enterprises to get rich.
Between wiping names from official registers, issuing bonuses to local staff
for resolving “incidents,” and hiring private enterprises to stop petitioners, a
national market for stability maintenance is opening up. Zhang and the Cai-
jing journalists see this market as the natural consequence of the current
structure of stability maintenance and the method used to evaluate local
governments. Zhang points out some positive developments, such as the
closure of the liaison offices in Beijing and some innovations in the letters
and visits system in Shenyang, Liaoning Province, where petitioners’ cases
are publicly heard in front of experts and deputies of the local People’s Con-
gress and Political Consultative Conference. But Zhang says that measures
like the simple reform of the rules surrounding letters and visits cannot re-
solve these problems, which have their roots in the power relations of the
petitioning system. As illustrated by the use of private enterprises to ob-
struct petitioners, local authorities can always just pay lip service to any
new orders (yangfeng yinwei 阳奉阴违). Zhang criticises the letters and vis-
its system as intrinsically unsuited to resolving local problems. He says that
even if it were the concern of the central authorities to resolve local prob-
lems, they would need material and human resources that they simply do
not have. As it stands, the system is structured so that citizens voice their
problems and then go home – as if simply articulating them will somehow
make them go away.
The system costs local governments a great deal in terms of both legiti-
macy and financial resources. Xia Nan says it is a vicious cycle that serves
to reinforce the dual pressure on local governments from the people and
from central authorities. The “mafiasation” (heisehua 黑色化) of the prac-
tices associated with maintaining social stability increases tensions between
the government and the people, while the cost of these practices further
financially weakens localities, and thus can affect local governments’ eval-
uation by the central authorities. Xia says that in the long term, the most
serious concern is the deterioration of the authorities’ relations with the
people, as well as relations among the people. He points to the toxic climate
these methods create, giving the example of an old man denounced by the
employees of a photocopy shop in Shanxi when they discovered he was
preparing a petition file. After ten years, the current policy of maintaining
stability has resulted in untenable fiscal practices and inconsistent results.
z Translated by Elizabeth Laederich.
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